PART TWO

Risk/Threat Analysis

Examination of historical and contemporary risk and threat reveals a common influence – complexity. Multiple factors doubtless shaped Allied thinking in the 1940s: the relentless cost in men and materiel; political unity in the home base; strategic relationships between key protagonists; and the possible post-war shaping of Europe, the Middle East and Asia.

In the contemporary landscape there exist similar challenges, albeit played out in a different context and shaped by the exigencies of global financial interdependencies and trade, exacerbated by the effects of digitisation, mass migration and climate change.

Historical Context

For the Allies in 1944, the opening of a second front in Western Europe was never in question. It was self-evident that the Germans would have to be defeated across all theatres and that Berlin was the ultimate Allied target. Furthermore, it was clear from the outset that the Allied decision to pursue the ‘unconditional surrender’ of the Nazi regime effectively closed the doors to other potential negotiated outcomes and could lead to greater determination among the German leadership to fight on – the ‘least worst’ option for some Nazis.

Although large-scale open conflict is uncommon today (the war in Ukraine illustrates that it should never be ruled out), it is more likely that conflict will be experienced in a broader, less defined form ranging from grey-zone or sub-threshold activities at one end of the scale, to small-scale actions to influence, intimidate and disrupt adversaries, and larger-scale AA/AD.

Strategic Relationships

In the run-up to D-Day, the principal strategic concern among the Allies (beyond defeating the Germans) was the relationship with the Soviet Union, not least because the ideological separation between liberal democratic Western allies and their communist counterparts sat awkwardly with the authoritarian Soviets.

By mid-1942 the Soviet Union were desperate for some relief in the East and encouraged their Western allies to increase pressure on the Germans in the West. Soviet determination to dominate the European landscape in any following peace was very real and compelled the Allies to generate and maintain strategic momentum in the West, notwithstanding Soviet reliance on US and British supply.

To the Allies, the struggle was an existential one and the risks attending even partial failure were profound, especially when considered in the scope of unconstrained Soviet expansionism. Failure by the Allies would be very costly and thus the imperative for Operation Overlord to succeed was reinforced.

Furthermore, any risk calculus was complicated by the requirement to deal with the vanquished. Addressing the needs of a destroyed Germany and a shattered Japan (once the latter were defeated) were serious challenges which could not be ignored. Moreover, the three-front approach in a truly global conflict was complicated by the territorial and ideological ambition of the Soviets and the imperial ambitions of the British.

Comparison with Today

The modern world is similar but rests on a much more complex foundation. Growing inequality between the developed North and the Global South promotes large-scale migration that flows northwards, while economic stasis in much of the developed world impedes both the ability and appetite to absorb it. Potential adversaries can see possibilities in the margins of such activity to undermine the democracies of the West.

Furthermore, established blocs such as NATO, the EU, and the international rules-based order are increasingly challenged both by growing domestic political opposition within Western states and deliberate interference from hostile external actors.

Political Unity

Franklin D. Roosevelt had been re-elected in 1940 and, whilst deteriorating in health, was nonetheless politically strong. The United States could clearly identify national interest in the successful outcome of Overlord, which set the seal on America’s position as the pre-eminent global power.

In Britain, Winston Churchill sat atop a coalition which, whilst generally stable, was divided on the national post-war future. The 1942 Beveridge Report influenced a slew of future social reforms which were embraced by the Labour Party and led to their landslide victory in the 1945 election – a victory informed by popular national concern over the future. This would be the defining British political influence of the time.

Comparison with Today

Politics today is less straightforward and more difficult to define. Digitisation in all its forms has enhanced information flows to the point where democratic politicians are extremely cautious and unlikely to take risks.

Likewise, investment in the sort of capabilities required to counter contemporary threats is expensive and therefore unpopular when hospitals, schools and other public services are strapped for cash. One of the commodities that will be in great demand is people and, under current conditions, recruitment – or worse, conscription – into defence is likely to be seriously unpopular across Western nations.

Cost

The economic and industrial power of the United States was highly influential in the conduct of the war from 1942 onwards and was particularly important for Operation Overlord. Britain had been severely weakened by the fight, operating as a war economy with all industrial output focused upon supporting the effort.

By mid-1944 the British state was approaching exhaustion, whereas for the United States, with a rapidly expanding economy and increasing global markets, the Second World War provided a welcome commercial opportunity to some US businesses.

But the cost in men was of particular concern, particularly for the British where memories of the generational slaughter represented by the First World War were still fresh. With eyes on the post-war world, Britain would be heavily reliant upon a returning workforce of able-bodied men and thus limiting the human cost of operations was key.

Comparison with today

The modern Western corollary is volunteer forces: small in scale and with limited depth of reserves in either personnel, equipment or ammunition, and thus ill-prepared for conflict in short order. The same cannot be said for potential adversaries. China has a vast military backed by significant industrial potential. Russia, whilst lacking Chinese capacity, nonetheless has an ambition to restore former power and a large population which the Russian leadership views as expendable.

The cost of mobilising for modern conflict will be prohibitively expensive and thus unlikely to be politically attractive among Western liberal democracies. Any contemporary approach is likely to mirror the British Second World War ‘steel, not flesh’ policy: why should we send our children into battle when drones can do it?

Equally, grey-zone interference through cyber-attacks or the disruption of critical national infrastructure – such as subsea data cables or power supplies – could have a devastating effect upon Western economies. The whole is further affected by the development of AI, the unconstrained spread of information through social media and global digital interconnectivity.

The sum of these threats is significant and the resultant cost of addressing them is politically unpalatable when there are so many competing demands upon the public purse. However, the risk to security is vast.

Chapter 2 Picture Credits

German Teller mines fixed to posts, exposed at low tide.; Courtesy National Archives, NAID 204892392